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REASON AND LAW 
George C. Christie* 
JUSTICE, LAW, AND .ARGUMENT: ESSAYS IN MORAL AND LEGAL 
REASONING. By Chaim Perelman with an introduction by Harold J. 
Berman. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1980. Pp. 
xiii, 181. Cloth $28.50; paper $10.50. 
Justice, Law, and Argument is a collection of seventeen of Chaim 
Perelman's essays on "moral and legal reasoning" that span a period 
of over thirty-five years. When Professor Perelman of the Universite 
Libre de Bruxelles began his illustrious career almost forty years ago, 
he shared the common view of many legal and moral philosophers 
that the most a scholar interested in the question of justice could do 
was to isolate the ultimate value judgments underlying our basic 
conceptions of law and morality. 1 While one could criticize the ap-
plication of any particular notion of justice to concrete circumstances 
as being more or less consistent with that notion - in short, one 
could criticize the application of the rules of justice as arbitrary2 -
the choice of any specific concept of justice over another could not 
be subjected to criticism. An individual's choice of ultimate values 
was beyond philosophical analysis (p. 55). According to the conven-
tional wisdom, philosophers could identify moral issues, but could 
not resolve them. 
In the course, however, of examining the nature of informal ar-
gumentation - which resulted in the publication, in collaboration 
with Mme. Olbrechts-Tyteca, of the now classic, The New Rhetoric: A 
Treatise on Argumentation3 - Perelman concluded that this was not 
* James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1955, J.D. 1957, Columbia 
University; S.J.D. 1966, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. He thus early on identified at least six rather widely held concepts of justice: (1) to each 
the same thing; (2) to each according to his merits; (3) to each according to his works; (4) to 
each according to his needs; (5) to each according to his rank; and (6) to each according to his 
legal entitlement. P. 2. In the course of his studies, he concluded that these six divergent ideas 
of justice shared one common structural property, which was that people placed (according to 
whatever criterion that might be chosen) in essentially the same category should be treated as 
equals. Pp. 20-22, 84. 
2. It is because the idea of justice is structurally associated with the notion of consistency 
that, as Perelman notes, ''.justice ... is the characteristic virtue of the reasonable man." P. 34. 
Moreover, Perelman notes, justice may not be the only ultimate value to which we subscribe. 
To the extent that the ''.just" solution may conflict with other values that we accept, the just 
solution may itself be criticized as "arbitrary." See pp. 92-94. 
3. C. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC (J. Wilkinson & P. 
Weaver trans. 1969). This work was originally published in French as TRAITE DE 
L'ARGUMENTATION in 1958. Among Perelman's other works published in English are THE 
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all that could be said on the subject (pp. 57-61).4 Despite what many 
philosophers, especially since Descartes and Spinoza, had con-
tended, there was a tradition in Western thought that refused to con-
fine philosophical reasoning to conclusions that had been arrived at 
by some sort of deductive process. At least since the time of Aris-
totle, philosophers have studied how people have sought to persuade 
others of the reasonableness of their arguments and conclusions, 
and of the reasonableness of the courses of action that they have 
espoused. 
One of the particularly important insights developed by Perel-
man in The New Rhetoric was his concept of the "universal audi-
ence."5 While most argument, particularly in an advanced and 
technologically complex society, is addressed increasingly to a spe-
cialized audience sharing not only particular values but highly spe-
cialized knowledge, everyone at some time or other speaks to an 
audience that is limitless and unchanging. A moral or legal philoso-
pher does so, for example, when he explores society's basic notions 
of justice and the good. Whether there is in fact any such identifiable 
entity as a universal audience is, of course, a moot question.6 Never-
theless, by acting as if such an audience did exist we reaffirm our 
belief that there are such things as "truth" and "reason." One might 
add that, without something like a belief in a universal audience, 
how could we preserve our own sanity and break out of the con-
straints of a sterile solipsism? In the present collection of essays, Per-
elman makes the following statement about the need of the 
philosopher to address the universal audience: 
The activity of the philosopher, master of wisdom and guide for 
actions, consists in taking a stand correlative to his vision of the world; 
it is based on selection, on choice. The danger of choice is partiality -
neglecting opposing points of view and closing one's mind to the ideas 
of others. The difficulty of the philosopher's task is that, like a judge, 
he must arrive at decisions while remaining impartial. That is why the 
philosopher's rationality will be founded on a rule common to all 
tribunals worthy of that name: Audiatur et a/tera pars. In philosophy, 
opposing points of view must be heard, whatever their nature or their 
source. This is a fundamental principle for all philosophers who do 
IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT (J. Petrie trans. 1963); a collection of 
essays published as JUSTICE (1967); THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES (1980); and 
THE REALM OF RHETORIC (W. Kluback trans.) (forthcoming). 
4. Perelman declares that it was his reluctance to accept the conclusion that the choice of 
ultimate values was purely arbitrary, particularly in the light of the Nazi experience, that led 
him to embark with Mme. Olbrechts-Tyteca on this inquiry. P. 149. 
5. See C. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 3, at§§ 7, 16-18, 28. 
6. Perelman points out that even in argument addressed to particular audiences, "the audi-
ence .•• is always a more or less systematized construction." Id at § 4, al 19. The only 
essential point is that the speaker's "construction of the audience should be adequate to the 
occasion." Id 
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not believe that they can found their conceptions on necessity and self-
evidence; for it is only by this principle that they can justify their claim 
to universality. 
Just as a judge, after he has heard the parties, must choose between 
them, so a philosopher cannot grant the same validity to all opinions. 
Many of the theses and values submitted to his scrutiny represent inter-
ests and aspirations of limited scope and conflict with views of univer-
sal import. To the extent that the philosopher bases his decisions on 
rules that ought to be valid for all mankind, he cannot subscribe to 
principles and values that cannot be universalized, and which could 
therefore not be accepted by the universal audience to which he ad-
dresses himself. [P. 71.] 
The philosopher, in short, can make value judgments that have some 
degree of universality, but to do so, he must believe that he can per-
suade the ''universal audience" to accept his premises. 
The search for accepted principles and values upon which to base 
informal argumentation is, of course, difficult, particularly as the 
composition of the audience is expanded over time and distance. 
There are, however, certain techniques, certain structural presump-
tions that can be called upon for assistance. It is a recurring feature 
of all human reasoning, but particularly of legal reasoning, for in-
stance, that it is change that needs justification (pp. 28, 134). This is 
why the doctrine of stare decisis is so compelling. Even in a world 
where everything is accepted as relative, nevertheless, as a practical 
matter, all human communication needs some starting points that 
are accepted as at least provisionally valid by the participants in any 
discussion. This is particularly true when people have to decide 
what to do.7 For want of anything better, whatever actually exists, 
particularly if its existence is of long standing, 8 seems to be a natural 
starting point. 
In pursuing this line of thought, Perelman several times stresses 
how valuable the paradigm of legal reasoning is for the moral phi-
losopher. To accept the paradigm of mathematics, as so many moral 
7. Perelman comments: 
Since Hume many have pointed out that one cannot logically deduce a right from a fact, 
nor what ought to be from what is. But no logical deduction is made when one is dealing 
with behavior that is customary, or with a situation that is traditional. It is only when 
someone maintains that what ought to be is different from what is that proof has to be 
supplied. Proof is incumbent upon the man who asserts that the customary action is un-
just, not upon him who acts in accordance with custom. It is presumed that what is, is 
what ought to be: Only in upsetting a presumption must proof be given. The principle of 
inertia thus plays an indispensable stabilizing role in social life. This does not mean that 
what is must remain forever, but rather that there should be no change without reason. 
Change only must be justified. 
P. 28 (emphasis in original). 
8. Compare this to Hume's observation concerning the legitimacy of governments in which 
he stated that the firmest foundation of "the right of magistry" is "long possession." D. HUME, 
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Bk. III, Pt. II, § X, at 556. (L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888) (em-
phasis in original). 
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philosophers since Descartes and Spinoza have done, is to reduce 
moral philosophy to the trivial and prevent it from examining the 
most basic moral questions by making these questions essentially un-
decidable.9 But in contrast to the apparent clarity of mathematics -
whose clarity is in large part owing to the fact that it is a product of 
conceptual abstraction - law and philosophy are characterized by 
what Perelman calls "confused notions." 10 We could not hope to 
begin to make sense out of the complexity of the world, Perelman 
claims, without the use of these vague, :flexible concepts. General 
notions of justice and equity, which often are at variance with the 
literal text of particular laws, are typical illustrations. Much of infor-
mal argumentation, whether in law or in philosophy, is concerned 
with the attempt to apply and to use these notions in the resolution 
of the concrete controversies presented for decision. 
As a method of informal argumentation, however, legal reason-
ing has at least two features not shared by philosophy: Its premises 
are more generally accepted and (perhaps most important) it has an 
authoritative decision-making procedure. The moral philosopher, 
by contrast, can never close off a discussion (p. 71). He must con-
tinue to deal indefinitely with any reasonable objection to his 
conclusions. 
Perelman stresses, however - and I think this is important -
that despite the presence of an authoritative decision-maker, rules of 
law cannot be considered to function analogously to the rules of a 
game. Games are played in artificial and narrowly circumscribed 
environments. Law and morality confront a much more complex 
reality: 
In fact, however precise a law may be, it cannot enumerate all situ-
ations in which, for unforeseen reasons, it cannot be applied. At best, 
it will contain clauses such as "case of superior force," "the invincible 
force of events," "extraordinary situation," which limit its application. 
In the end, therefore, it is the judge or the police who must interpret it 
in each concrete situation. 
To see a legal text only as a means in terms of an end and not a 
statement which is applicable in any circumstances voids any assimila-
tion of a legal rule to a game rule. The game rule evades all conflict 
and is, by definition as long as it is uninterrupted artificially, isolated 
from reality. If we see in law only a normative structure and are una-
ware of the functions oflaw in society, then the pure theory oflaw, for 
methodological reasons, risks the separation of the legal system from 
9. See pp. 163-67. For a recent discussion examining and decrying the movement in the 
nineteenth century away from an Aristotelian to a formal model of legal reasoning, see Siegel, 
Tlte Aristotelian Basis ef English Law 1450-1850, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1981). 
10. See ch. 10 (''The Use and Abuse of Confused Notions"). There is an obvious parallel 
here to Gallie's "essentially contested concepts." See Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 
56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SocY. (n.s.) 167 (1956). See generally Christie, Vagueness and Legal 
Language, 48 MINN. L. REV. 885 (1964). 
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its social and political context and background. In fact, in an abnor-
mal situation, unforeseen by the legislature, we stand before a legal 
gap, which the responsible powers, the executive and then the judici-
ary, must, for better or worse, fill. [P. 154.] 
For Perelman, the central characteristic of legal reasoning is that its 
premises, ''whatever they may be, whether it is a question of consti-
tutional principles, of laws, of judiciary precedents in the common 
law system, or even of general principles of law, have never been 
considered as self-evident" (p. 168), that is, "as imposing themselves 
in an unambiguous fashion on all rational beings" (p. 168). "But, on 
the other hand," he continues, "neither have they ever been consid-
ered as arbitrary. Situated in a social, political, and historical con-
text, they find, in this context, reasons which explain and justify their 
acceptance" (p. 168). The consistent application of the rules of a 
game can be fairly well worked out in advance, but this cannot be 
done for legal rules, which must respond to conflicting demands for 
"social justice" (pp. 50-51). 
The very indefiniteness of legal sources will necessarily produce 
contested cases, instances where informal argumentation cannot de-
finitively resolve all the issues. The role of authority then becomes 
critical. For me, the most intriguing theme touched on in these es-
says is this relationship between law and authority. It is obvious, as 
Perelman notes (pp. 80, 121), that when a legal decision proceeds 
from generally accepted premises, that is, when these decisions are in 
accord with the customs and values of a community, the need to rely 
on authority or force is diminished. The real difficulties arise when 
the issues are difficult, and the answers appear uncertain. It is char-
acteristic of societies in which the Western notion of the rule oflaw 
prevails that judges and other public officials are empowered in these 
circumstances to decide upon the reasonable solution. In the long 
run, of course, the decisions of authority must, on the whole, be ac-
cepted as reasonable by society. Otherwise the legitimacy of authori-
tative decision-makers, one might even say their ability to function 
as authorities, will be questioned. Although this ultimate fragility of 
authority has been accentuated in the modem social order, it still 
appears to be true that it is a central feature, indeed a requirement, 
of the rule of law that society allow authority to decide what is rea-
sonable in contested cases. 11 
11. After mentioning, first, agreement as a form of express consensus and then custom as a 
form of implicit consensus, Perelman continues: 
[T]he final form of consensus is indirect: the question of agreement upon a rule or prece-
dent considered as just does not enter into it, rather it is a matter of trust placed in an 
authority which is accepted by the members of a community, whose decisions are binding 
and to which it will accordingly be just to conform. This will be a matter of religious 
authority such as God or his spokesmen for a religious community, or of a political au-
thority such as a monarch, parliament or judge, whose powers will be admitted within the 
framework of an accepted ideology in the political community. 
Pp. 91-92 (emphasis in original). 
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These almost self-evident observations suggest that, when the is-
sue cannot be resolved by reference to "facts" or to a shared consen-
sus, all informal argumentation ultimately requires resort to 
authority .if it is to reach any sort of conclusions. Without the ac-
ceptance of any such authoritative means of decision, informal argu-
mentation can never resolve a contested issue. Whatever the abstract 
fascination of anarchism might be, it remains intellectually bank-
rupt. Without some deference to authority social organization 
would be impossible; mankind could never escape from the morass 
of solipsism. Human discourse requires both the existence of com-
monly accepted starting points - the topoi or common-place seats of 
argument discussed by Aristotle and by Perelman in The New Rheto-
ric - and the acceptance of some persons as authorities with the 
power to apply these accepted premises to concrete situations. Even 
philosophical argument, which in a sense is never closed, requires 
authoritative and accepted means of at least temporarily resolving 
some aspects of a dispute if any progress is to be made. In any dis-
cussion, we always accept some other person's say-so about some 
aspects of a disputed point. Sometimes this acceptance is based on 
the demonstrated or even purported superior knowledge of that 
other person, but this is not always the case. A speaker's tone of 
voice, his eloquence, and his personal magnetism can all contribute 
to the establishment of his authority12 - and this only scratches the 
surface of the subject. The role of authority in informal reasoning is 
thus for me one of the principal matters that any theory of argument 
must confront.13 How is this need for authority met? This is a ques-
tion whose resolution requires an exploration of the bases of West-
ern culture. It is no criticism of the present collection of essays that 
they merely raise this complex but fundamental question. 
The publication of Perelman's essays in English is a welcome de-
velopment. I hope that their publication will stimulate an English-
speaking audience to probe deeper into the work of Perelman and 
Aristotle on informal argumentation and to contribute to the further 
development of this difficult but fascinating essential subject. 
12. See ARlsTOTLE, RHETORIC Bk. II. cc. 1-17 (9 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED 
INTO ENGLISH (1924)), where Aristotle discusses the means by which a speaker builds up his 
own credibility and persuasiveness and destroys that of his opponents. See also C. PERELMAN 
& L. OLBRECHTS-'l'YTECA, supra note 3, at 305-21 (§§ 70-73). 
13. For a discussion of the notion of authority in the context of a legal system, sec G. 
CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY (1982) (forthcoming). 
